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1977 
After Corwin: Down the Controlling 
Shareholder Rabbit Hole 
Ann M. Lipton* 
As Delaware has developed its doctrine with respect to controlling 
shareholders, its view of their relationship to directors has evolved. This 
evolution has produced some pronounced inconsistencies with respect to the 
weight placed on director approval of controlling shareholder action. The recent 
Delaware Supreme Court decisions in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., and C & J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of 
Miami General Employees’ and Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust 
introduced further uncertainty into the mix by making the determination as to 
whether a transaction involves a controlling shareholder practically outcome-
determinative of many shareholder disputes. If a controlling shareholder is 
present, there is the potential for close court examination to ensure fairness to 
the minority; if not, any shareholder challenge is likely to be dismissed without 
even the chance for discovery.  
Yet even as the presence or absence of a controlling shareholder takes 
on heightened importance, changes in the business landscape have made 
controllers more difficult to identify. More companies are adopting multiclass 
capital structures both in public and private markets, and the popularity of 
management buyouts means that shareholders with significant stakes, ties to 
directors, and informational advantages are often placed across the bargaining 
table from companies themselves. The upshot is that courts are called upon to 
make early, critical judgments regarding levels of control in an increasingly 
complex corporate ecosystem. 
This Essay, prepared for the Institute for Law & Economic Policy’s 25th 
Annual Symposium, maps the points of doctrinal divergence and proposes 
changes to the law that better align the concerns posed by controlling 
shareholders with the law’s treatment of them. In particular, this Essay argues 
that courts do not pay sufficient attention to the most salient fact about 
 
 * Michael M. Fleishman Associate Professor in Business Law and Entrepreneurship, 
Tulane Law School. I am grateful for the thoughtful comments of Randall Baron, Joel Fleming, 
Sean Griffith, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster, Elizabeth Pollman, Srinivas M. Raju, Vice Chancellor 
Joseph Slights, and all the participants in the Institute for Law & Economic Policy’s 25th Annual 
Symposium, Wisconsin Law School’s Rethinking the Shareholder Franchise Symposium, and the 
Tulane Law School 2019 Faculty Symposium. Errors are very much my own. 
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controlling shareholders: their immunity to the ordinary mechanisms of market 
discipline. To ensure that the presence of a controller is accurately identified 
and the appropriate level of scrutiny applied to its self-interested transactions, 
courts should focus not merely on the putative controller’s influence over the 
board, but on the mechanisms of self-help realistically available to the 
unaffiliated shareholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate law has an uneasy relationship with controlling 
shareholders. Corporations are designed to vest management authority 
in corporate directors and officers rather than shareholders,1 on the 
assumption that shareholders are too inexpert—and their preferences 
too divergent—to trust to make business decisions.2 Left to their 
devices, shareholders may drain wealth from the corporation in order 
to satisfy their private interests.3 For this reason, it is often said that 
directors of a corporation may advance what, in their judgment, are the 
corporation’s best interests, even over the objections of shareholders 
themselves.4 
At the same time, managers may shirk their responsibilities or 
leech wealth at the stockholders’ expense, and a dispersed and passive 
shareholder base may be incapable of adequately policing them. In 
these circumstances, controlling shareholders have the expertise and 
incentives to discipline management and ensure their focus on 
 
 1. See In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 5377-VCL, 2010 WL 2291842, at *15 (Del. 
Ch. May 25, 2010) (“[D]irector primacy remains the centerpiece of Delaware law, even when a 
controlling stockholder is present.”). 
 2. See Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297, 303–04 (2018). 
 3. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 306 (1998).  
 4. Lipton, supra note 2, at 302.   
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maximizing shareholder returns.5 Yet controlling shareholders—like 
any other shareholder—may also have interests that diverge from the 
minority and seek to “tunnel” private benefits to themselves by 
exploiting their informational advantages and influence over directors.6 
As a result, the law has taken an intermediate position with respect to 
these controllers: they have the right to vote and dispose of their shares 
to advance their own interests,7 but at the same time, they owe a 
fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders and may not use their 
control over the corporate machinery to extract private benefits.8 
As Delaware has developed its doctrine with respect to 
controlling shareholders, its view of their relationship to directors has 
evolved. This evolution has produced some pronounced inconsistencies 
with respect to the weight placed on director approval of controlling 
shareholder action.9 As a result, Delaware attempted to simplify its law 
in a series of decisions in 2014 and 2015. In Corwin v. KKR Financial 
Holdings LLC10 and its progeny, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that, so long as a transaction does not involve a conflicted controlling 
stockholder, the uncoerced, fully informed vote of disinterested 
stockholders will cleanse a breach of fiduciary duty by corporate 
directors in the event of a subsequent shareholder lawsuit. Meanwhile, 
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp.11 (“MFW”), set up an alternative 
scheme for controlling stockholder transactions, allowing them to be 
cleansed—and thus freed from judicial scrutiny if later challenged in 
court—only if the deal is negotiated and approved by disinterested and 
independent directors, and conditioned at the outset on the uncoerced 
vote of disinterested stockholders. Finally, C & J Energy Services, Inc. 
v. City of Miami General Employees’ and Sanitation Employees’ 
Retirement Trust12 (“C & J Energy”) sharply limited courts’ ability to 
 
 5. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 785, 785 (2003). 
 6. In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962-VCL, 2016 WL 
301245, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016); see also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 81 
(Del. 1995) (relating a controlling shareholder’s self-interested behavior in a merger transaction); 
In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting the “informational 
and timing advantages” controlling shareholders possess).  
 7. See Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 440–42 (Del. 1996). 
 8. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971). 
 9. See In re Ezcorp Inc., 2016 WL 301245, at *16–26; In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., 
No. Civ.A. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006); In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 615 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 
547–51 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Pure Res., Inc., 808 A.2d at 436 n.17; Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, 
Sanitizing Interested Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 903, 920–24 (2011). 
 10. 125 A.3d 304, 311–13 (Del. 2015). 
 11. 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). 
 12. 107 A.3d 1049, 1072–73 (Del. 2014). 
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interfere with a pending shareholder vote; thus, so long as appropriate 
disclosures are made, even agreements reached in violation of directors’ 
fiduciary duties will be presented to stockholders. The net effect is that, 
at least in certain contexts, the determination whether a transaction 
involves a controlling shareholder is practically outcome-determinative 
of shareholder disputes: if a controlling shareholder is present, there is 
the potential for close court examination to ensure fairness to the 
minority; if there is not, any shareholder challenge is likely to be 
dismissed without even the chance for discovery.  
Yet even as the presence or absence of a controlling shareholder 
takes on heightened significance, changes in the business landscape 
have made controllers more difficult to identify. More companies are 
adopting multiclass capital structures both in public and private 
markets,13 and the popularity of management buyouts means that 
shareholders with significant stakes, ties to directors, and 
informational advantages are often placed across the bargaining table 
from the companies in which they have invested.14 The upshot is that 
in the earliest stages of litigation, courts are called upon to make critical 
judgments regarding levels of control in an increasingly complex 
corporate ecosystem. 
This Essay seeks to map the points of doctrinal divergence and 
propose changes to the law that better align the concerns posed by 
controlling shareholders with the law’s treatment of them. In 
particular, this Essay argues that courts do not pay sufficient attention 
to the most salient fact about controlling shareholders: their immunity 
to the ordinary mechanisms of market discipline. To ensure that the 
presence of a controller is accurately identified, and the appropriate 
level of scrutiny applied to its self-interested transactions, courts should 
focus not merely on the putative controller’s influence over the board, 
but on the mechanisms of self-help realistically available to the 
unaffiliated shareholders.  
 
 13. Robert P. Bartlett III, A Founder’s Guide to Unicorn Creation: How Liquidation 
Preferences in M&A Transactions Affect Start-Up Valuation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1, 4–6 (Hill & Davidoff-Solomon eds., 2016); Jill Fisch & Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1057, 1068–69 (2019); Will Gornall & 
Ilya A. Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 
2019) (manuscript at 2–3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955455 
[https://perma.cc/6FP2-4WXA]; Cynthia Clarfield Hess, Mark Leahy & Khang Tran, Unicorn 
Financings: First Half 2018, FENWICK & WEST 10 (2018) 
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Unicorn-Financings-First-Half-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UMM4-FFEG].  
 14. Adam Lewis, The US PE Industry in 11 Charts, PITCHBOOK (July 30, 2018), 
https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/the-us-pe-industry-in-11-charts [https://perma.cc/Y9NR-
RXNJ]. 
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I. WHO’S AFRAID OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS? 
Ordinarily, corporate directors are presumed to make business 
decisions in the best interest of the corporation, a principle known as 
the business judgment rule.15 That presumption may be rebutted for 
“interested” transactions, which are those decisions where some 
number of directors have financial interests that differ from those of the 
stockholders.16 Absent some sort of cleansing mechanism, should these 
transactions become the subject of a shareholder lawsuit, courts may 
substantively review them to ensure that they are entirely fair to the 
corporation and its stockholders. 
Because these lawsuits are expensive and their outcomes 
uncertain, corporate boards usually attempt to “cleanse” interested 
transactions by seeking advance approval from an objective body: either 
the disinterested and independent directors, or the disinterested 
stockholders.17 If such approval is obtained after full disclosure of the 
material facts, courts will once again defer to the directors’ 
decisionmaking, and a time-consuming and burdensome fairness 
review may be avoided.18  
To be sure, even in companies without a controlling shareholder, 
it has long been recognized that directors may suffer from “structural 
bias,” namely, a sense of sympathy and fellow feeling for their 
colleagues that prevents even disinterested and independent directors 
from scrutinizing conflicting interest transactions too closely.19 
Nonetheless, these biases are generally assumed to be mitigated by the 
shareholder franchise and the market for corporate control.20  
The presence of a controlling shareholder, however, amplifies 
the problem. Directors are no longer beholden to a dispersed 
shareholder base that may be presumed to be interested mainly, if not 
exclusively, in maximizing returns; instead, they may be beholden to a 
single entity with potentially idiosyncratic goals. Directors may fear the 
loss of their seat—and the loss of additional benefits the controller can 
 
 15. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 88–89 (2004).  
 16. J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1451–55 (2014). 
 17.  Hill & McDonnell, supra note 9, at 910. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981); Julian Velasco, Structural Bias 
and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 824 (2004). 
 20. In recognition of the fact that in some contexts—such as the buyout of a company, or 
defense against a hostile acquirer—directors’ structural biases may be especially strong and 
resistant to shareholder discipline, courts have typically applied a heightened level of scrutiny. 
See Laster, supra note 16, at 1463–65. That is precisely what Corwin changed, as discussed further 
below. 
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confer—if they fail to bow to the controller’s wishes.21 At the same time, 
there is great uncertainty as to the effectiveness of ordinary sanitizing 
mechanisms when the interested person is a controlling stockholder, 
due to the controller’s influence over the board and—by extension—
corporate conduct as a whole.  
In some of the earliest cases to address controlling shareholder 
conflicts, Delaware suggested, without fully exploring the issue, that 
interested transactions could be sanitized by the vote of the 
independent directors—that is, directors with no personal or 
professional ties to the controller other than the board seat itself—just 
as an ordinary director-interested transaction would be.22 Though these 
directors necessarily occupied their seats by the controller’s grace, 
Delaware assumed that their professionalism and sense of duty would 
trump any self-interest when it came to gauging the propriety of the 
controller’s dealings with the corporation.23  
Delaware became queasy, however, when it came to those 
transactions that, by statutory command, cannot be approved by 
directors alone, but instead require a vote of the stockholders.24 The 
controlling stockholder, necessarily, would be interested in the 
transaction, and even if the deal was conditioned on majority approval 
by the disinterested stockholders (a “majority of the minority”), there 
might still be cause for concern:25 
Even where no coercion is intended, shareholders voting on a parent subsidiary merger 
might perceive that their disapproval could risk retaliation of some kind by the controlling 
stockholder. For example, the controlling stockholder might decide to stop dividend 
payments or to effect a subsequent cash out merger at a less favorable price, for which 
the remedy would be time consuming and costly litigation. At the very least, the potential 
for that perception, and its possible impact upon a shareholder vote, could never be fully 
eliminated.26 
 
 21. Da Lin, Beyond Beholden, 44 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335195 [https://perma.cc/H9CP-2SEZ]. 
 22. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) (stating that if the transaction in question had been approved by an 
“independent corporate decisionmaker,” it would have received business judgment review); 
Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 406–07 (Del. 1988) (“It is well 
established in Delaware that one who stands on both sides of a transaction has the burden of 
proving its entire fairness. In the absence of arms length bargaining, clearly the situation here, 
this obligation inheres in, and invariably arises from the parent-subsidiary relationship.” 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695–96 (Del. Ch. 1971) 
(applying business judgment review to a controlling shareholder transaction approved by 
independent directors). 
 23. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814–15. 
 24. These include such matters as mergers and amendments to the corporate charter. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 251 (2019). 
 25. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994). 
 26. Id. (quoting Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990)). 
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In other words, minority shareholders might legitimately fear 
sabotage of the corporation by a disgruntled controlling shareholder, 
presumably in ways that would be too subtle or come too quickly for the 
cumbersome litigation process to remedy. Therefore, transactions with 
a controlling shareholder that required a shareholder vote were 
automatically suspect and subject to fairness review.27  
From there, Delaware law evolved to suggest that in the context 
of transactions requiring both shareholder and director approval, even 
independent directors may fear the wrath of controlling stockholders, 
such that their approval could not be assumed to be freely bestowed 
either.28 As then-Vice Chancellor Strine put it,  
[T]he [Delaware] Supreme Court saw the controlling stockholder as the 800–pound gorilla 
whose urgent hunger for the rest of the bananas is likely to frighten less powerful 
primates like putatively independent directors who might well have been hand-picked by 
the gorilla (and who at the very least owed their seats on the board to his support).29  
These decisions meshed poorly with earlier cases that placed 
great faith in the ability of independent directors to cleanse controlling 
shareholder actions; after all, if we do not trust them to do so when 
shareholder approval is also required, there is no reason to trust them 
to do so when it is not.30 Eventually, that distrust of independent 
director fortitude in the face of a controller’s overweening power seeped 
into judicial review of transactions that did not require a shareholder 
 
 27. See In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders. Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
 28. See Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997):  
Entire fairness remains applicable even when an independent committee is utilized 
because the underlying factors which raise the specter of impropriety can never be 
completely eradicated and still require careful judicial scrutiny. . . . The risk is thus 
created that those who pass upon the propriety of the transaction might perceive that 
disapproval may result in retaliation by the controlling shareholder. Consequently, 
even when the transaction is negotiated by a special committee of independent 
directors, “no court could be certain whether the transaction fully approximated what 
truly independent parties would have achieved in an arm’s length negotiation.” 
(quoting Citron, 584 A.2d at 502); Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1240–41 (Del. 
2012) (applying Kahn). 
 29. In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig, 808 A.2d 421, 436 (Del. Ch. 2002); see also Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We 
(and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 678 (2005) (“Delaware is more suspicious when the 
fiduciary who is interested is a controlling stockholder. When that is so, there is an obvious fear 
that even putatively independent directors may owe or feel a more-than-wholesome allegiance to 
the interests of the controller, rather than to the corporation and its public stockholders.”); Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 499, 509 (2002) [hereinafter The Inescapably Empirical Foundation] (“[T]his strain of 
thought was premised on the notion that when an 800-pound gorilla wants the rest of the bananas, 
little chimpanzees, like independent directors and minority stockholders, cannot be expected to 
stand in the way, even if the gorilla putatively gives them veto power.”). 
 30. See In re Pure Res., Inc., 808 A.2d at 436 n.17; Strine, The Inescapably Empirical 
Foundation, supra note 29, at 510 (both identifying the tension between Aronson’s trust of 
independent directors and the distrust expressed in later decisions). 
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vote at all.31 The case law thus evolved to suggest that any transaction 
in which a controlling shareholder has an interest that diverges from 
the minority is subject to fairness review by a court ex post—even if 
approved by independent directors or disinterested shareholders.32  
Yet on this, the law lagged in at least one significant respect: 
Delaware courts continued to remain rock solid in their confidence that 
independent directors could faithfully consider a shareholder’s demand 
that the corporation pursue litigation against a controlling shareholder 
alleged to have breached its duties to the corporation,33 despite their 
refusal to trust independent directors to stand against controllers in 
any other context. The realpolitik behind the discontinuity is obvious: 
the demand requirement is considered a critical bulwark against 
frivolous shareholder litigation. Moreover, litigation demands are, in a 
real sense, different from ordinary conflict transactions. If directors are 
too conflicted to consider the merits of a transaction, the court evaluates 
its fairness. By contrast, if directors are too conflicted to consider the 
merits of bringing litigation, shareholders themselves are permitted to 
assume control of corporate machinery to bring the action in their stead. 
For that reason, demand excusal may legitimately be viewed as its own 
category of problem.34 
Nonetheless, the disjunction creates both practical and 
theoretical problems. Deference in the context of a litigation demand 
potentially insulates a great variety of controller transactions that 
would otherwise merit closer judicial scrutiny.35 This gives rise to the 
 
 31. See Ams. Mining Corp., 51 A.3d at 1240; Kahn, 694 A.2d at 428. 
 32. See In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962-VCL, 2016 WL 
301245, at *12 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016); Laster, supra note 16, at 1460–63. For a time, controlling 
shareholder tender offers received lesser scrutiny by courts because they do not (technically) 
require the involvement of the target company’s board. See In re Pure Res., Inc., 808 A.2d at 439. 
More recent case law has harmonized the standards so that tender offers are likely to be treated 
similarly to other controlling shareholder transactions. Compare In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders 
Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 400 (Del. Ch. 2010) (describing the standard for reviewing controlling 
shareholder tender offers), with Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 645 (Del. 2014) 
(describing the standard for reviewing controlling shareholder buyouts). 
 33. In re Ezcorp Inc., 2016 WL 301245, at *29. 
 34. Notably, when it comes to special litigation committees formed to insulate an otherwise 
conflicted board, courts evaluate, in a sense, the fairness of the committee’s decisionmaking, see 
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 1981) (“[T]he Court should inquire into the 
independence and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions.”), which 
is perhaps more akin to the fairness inquiry conducted in the context of other types of conflicted 
decisions. 
 35. Itai Fiegenbaum, The Controlling Shareholder Enforcement Gap, AM. BUS. L.J. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 28), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3227828 
[https://perma.cc/228J-E9CM]. Some decisions have suggested that if the underlying transaction 
is one that would give rise to fairness review, then any director—independent or not—who was 
involved in its approval would not be able to faithfully consider a demand for litigation. See, e.g., 
Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211, 1231 n.47 (Del. Ch. 2001) (finding 
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uncomfortable possibility that even for a transaction that would 
ordinarily receive entire fairness review, we will defer to independent 
directors in deciding whether a lawsuit can be brought at all.36 On a 
more general level, Delaware has created a menu of case law that can 
be used to paper over inconsistencies whenever they appear, so that 
independent directors are trusted to a greater or lesser extent as the 
court prefers, without the need for further justification.37 
There is at least one (limited) path out of this dilemma: to elide 
the demand requirement entirely. Demand is, of course, unnecessary 
for claims brought directly rather than derivatively, and the Delaware 
Supreme Court has held that some transactions that would be treated 
as “derivative” in any other context may be characterized as “direct” 
when they involve controlling shareholders. Specifically, when a 
corporation is alleged to have issued voting stock to its controller for 
less than its true value, the dilution to the minority’s voting power is 
treated as a direct, rather than a derivative, harm, making demand 
unnecessary.38 Therefore, at least in this context, courts and litigants 
can simply examine the underlying transaction without confronting the 
broader hiccups in Delaware’s controlling shareholder doctrine.  
In 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court changed the landscape 
again when it decided MFW. There, the court held that a controlling 
shareholder freezeout merger of the minority—previously subject only 
to entire fairness review—would be insulated from judicial scrutiny if 
it was approved by a fully empowered committee of independent 
directors and conditioned from the outset on a fully informed, uncoerced 
vote of the disinterested stockholders.39 The MFW framework sits 
uneasily alongside the prior caselaw, as its purpose is to replicate “the 
shareholder-protective characteristics of third-party, arm’s-length 
mergers.”40 While that may be appropriate in the merger context, the 
logic hardly applies to transactions that would not have required 
 
the director at issue to be conflicted). The Delaware Supreme Court has not, so far, embraced the 
idea. See In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1182–83 (Del. 
2015). 
 36. In re Ezcorp Inc., 2016 WL 301245, at *29; Fiegenbaum, supra note 35 (manuscript at 
28). 
 37. For example, though mergers present the paradigmatic scenario where Delaware has 
held that independent directors cannot be trusted, in two recent merger cases, the Delaware 
Supreme Court relied on the classically deferential demand excusal case, Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), to forgive flaws in the negotiation process, see Flood v. Synutra Int’l., Inc., 
195 A.3d 754, 759 n.37 (Del. 2018), and to dismiss directors from litigation, see In re Cornerstone 
Therapeutics, 115 A.3d at 1182–83.  
 38. See El Paso Pipeline GP Co. v. Brinckerhoff, 152 A.3d 1248, 1263 (Del. 2016).  
 39. MFW, 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). 
 40. Id. 
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stockholder approval to begin with.41 Nonetheless, Chancery decisions 
have applied the MFW framework to the same conflicted controller 
transactions that previously would have been evaluated for fairness—
even those transactions that do not ordinarily require a stockholder 
vote.42 As a result, under the new regime, outside of the context of 
demand excusal,43 it appears that all conflicted controller transactions 
are subject to searching judicial scrutiny unless they are cleansed in the 
manner outlined in MFW.44  
Yet the full implications of MFW are only evident when it is 
examined alongside C & J Energy, decided later the same year, and 
Corwin, issued the year following. Corwin held that when there is no 
controlling shareholder, a fully informed, uncoerced stockholder vote 
operates to restore business judgment deference to board action.45 This 
represented a break from precedent providing that—at least for 
corporate buyouts—some form of enhanced judicial scrutiny would be 
available.46 Meanwhile, C & J Energy limited courts’ ability to 
preliminarily enjoin a stockholder vote while litigants conduct 
 
 41. Cf. In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at 
*11–12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (recognizing that the framework described in Kahn v. Lynch 
Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994), does not precisely map to other 
kinds of transactions); In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, 
at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (majority-of-the-minority voting condition to cleanse a merger is 
measured by outstanding rather than voting shares in order to replicate the statutory 
requirements for arm’s length mergers).  The court in Tornetta v. Musk, No. 2018-0408-JRS, 2019 
WL 4566943, at *13 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 2019), recognized as much, and, in the context of a stock 
compensation award to a controller, held that the MFW cleansing conditions would be satisfied by 
majority approval of the unaffiliated voting shares, rather than—as in the context of a merger—
majority approval of the unaffiliated outstanding shares. 
 42. See Tornetta, 2019 WL 4566943, at *4 (stock compensation paid to controller); In re 
Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962-VCL, 2016 WL 301245, at *11–12 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (conflicted consulting payments); see also IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed 
v. Crane, No. 12742–CB, 2017 WL 7053964, at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) (endorsing the use of 
the framework for “transactions involving controllers”). 
 43. In re Ezcorp Inc., 2016 WL 301245, at *29.   
 44. Although in Friedman v. Dolan, No. 9425-VCN, 2015 WL 4040806, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 
30, 2015), the court held that executive compensation paid to a controller could be cleansed by the 
approval of the independent directors alone, subsequent Delaware Chancery Court decisions have 
declined to follow that position.  See Tornetta, 2019 WL 4566943, at *4; In re Ezcorp Inc., 2016 WL 
301245, at *18–23.  In Feuer ex rel. CBS Corp. v. Redstone, No. 12575-CB, 2018 WL 1870074, at 
*10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2018), the transaction—salary paid to a controller for board service, 
authorized by independent directors —was reviewed for waste, without any suggestion that entire 
fairness would be an appropriate standard of review for failure to obtain stockholder ratification 
under MFW. However, because Redstone was a derivative action and subject to the demand 
requirement, this may have been an artifact of the procedural posture; demand may only have 
been futile with respect to independent directors alleged to have approved a wasteful, rather than 
unfair, transaction. 
 45. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 314 (Del. 2015). 
 46. See Iman Anabtawi, The Twilight of Enhanced Scrutiny in Delaware M&A 
Jurisprudence, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161, 166–67 (2019). 
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expedited discovery, on the theory that doing so could cost shareholders 
a valuable deal and is unnecessary to boot because shareholders can 
choose to reject unfavorable transactions without judicial 
interference.47  
Together, the trio of cases has widened the gulf between 
transactions that involve a controlling shareholder and those that do 
not. The latter can be fully cleansed by a shareholder vote, even in the 
face of director conflict and breach of fiduciary duty,48 permitting the 
resolution of stockholder challenges on the pleadings and without 
discovery.49 By contrast, the presence of a controlling shareholder will 
trigger thorough judicial review unless the controller runs a precise 
procedural gauntlet.50 Enormous weight, then, is placed on that initial 
determination as to whether a transaction involves a controlling 
shareholder in the first place—and the definition of what counts as 
control. 
II. IDENTIFYING MINORITY CONTROLLERS 
If heightened scrutiny is to be applied to (some) controlling 
shareholder transactions, courts must be able to distinguish between 
controllers and noncontrollers. Certainly, anyone who possesses more 
than fifty percent of a corporation’s voting power is a controller,51 but 
when the putative controller’s voting power does not rise to that level, 
control status depends on whether the putative controller “exercises 
control over the business affairs of the corporation.”52 Plaintiffs seeking 
to establish the existence of a controller in the absence of majority 
voting power may prove either “(1) that the minority blockholder 
actually dominated and controlled the corporation, its board or the 
deciding committee with respect to the challenged transaction or (2) 
 
 47. See C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’, 107 A.3d 1049, 1072–73 (Del. 
2014). 
 48. Litigants have argued that Corwin does not apply to transactions with no controlling 
shareholder, but in which a majority of the board is interested. Thus far, Delaware Chancery 
disagrees. See In re Merge Healthcare Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 11388-VCG, 2017 WL 395981, 
at *6–7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2017); Larkin v. Shah, No. 10918-VCS, 2016 WL 4485447, at *10–12 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016). 
 49. See Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of 
Successful Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 623, 644 (2017); Joseph R. 
Slights III, Lecture, Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC–An “After-Action Report,” 24 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 6, 13–14 (2018). 
 50. The entire fairness review standard only applies to conflict transactions. If there is no 
conflict—such as where a controlling shareholder receives the same merger consideration as the 
minority—the transaction will receive business judgment deference. In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder 
Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1034 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 51. Weinstein Enters., Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 507 (Del. 2005). 
 52. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994). 
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that the minority blockholder actually dominated and controlled the 
majority of the board generally.”53 As Vice Chancellor Slights put it, the 
latter scenario may manifest in “the board’s awareness of [the putative 
controller’s] ability to make changes at the board level or to push other 
coercive levers should he be displeased with the board’s performance or 
decision making.”54 
To be sure, there may be something anomalous about applying 
the MFW framework—and its majority-of-minority voting conditions—
to a conflict transaction involving someone with less than fifty percent 
of the voting power, if only because a majority-of-minority condition 
may not have much more bite than ordinary stockholder voting if the 
putative controller has a small stake.55 Yet, as it turns out, the dual 
protections of MFW have significance in this context because, unlike 
transactions subject to Corwin, a deal subject to MFW cannot be 
cleansed by a shareholder vote alone.56  
Inquiries into minority-controller status have always been fact 
intensive, but recent transformations in how businesses are funded 
have introduced new types of problems. Congress and the SEC have 
made it easier for businesses to raise capital privately57 while 
simultaneously loosening restrictions on the size of private funding 
vehicles.58 As a result, businesses today often eschew a public offering 
of common shares in favor of venture capital financing via the issuance 
of preferred shares.59 But preferred shares carry with them bespoke 
control rights, such as board representation, antidilution guarantees, 
 
 53. In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at *13 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 28, 2018); see also FrontFour Capital Grp. v. Taube, No. 2019-0100-KSJM, 2019 WL 
1313408, at *22 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2019); In re Rouse Props., Inc., No. 12194-VCS, 2018 WL 
1226015, at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018). 
 54. In re Rouse Props., 2018 WL 1226015, at *12. 
 55. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form over Substance? The Value of Corporate 
Process and Management Buy-Outs, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 877 (2011). 
 56. If the minority-interested party has a large enough stake, however, a majority-of-the-
minority voting condition may make a difference. For example, when Michael Dell took Dell 
private, he controlled a sizeable, but noncontrolling, block, and was still unable to obtain the 
affirmative vote of a majority of the unaffiliated outstanding shares. Dell v. Magnetar Glob. Event 
Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 14–15 (Del. 2017). 
 57. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the 
Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 467–69 (2017); Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance 
Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 176–77 (2017); Janet D. Lowder, Rule 701 Additional 
Disclosure Threshold Raised to $10M, NAT. L. REV. (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/rule-701-additionaldisclosure-threshold-raised-to-10m-sec-
solicits-comments-to [https://perma.cc/KP54-TCMH] (describing easing of rules for issuing stock 
compensation to employees). 
 58. de Fontenay, supra note 57, at 467–68. 
 59. Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
(manuscript at 17), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3352203 
[https://perma.cc/2QQD-TYTC]. 
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and the ability to veto certain actions.60 With each new round of 
funding, a single business will issue a new class of preferred shares with 
its own unique set of terms, often accompanied by “changes to the 
company’s governance structure, such as the size and composition of the 
board.”61 Capital structures may become so complex that the firm needs 
to hire an outside “equity manager” simply to keep an accurate 
accounting of various investors’ rights.62 The result is that in their later 
stages, private companies may be funded by a heterogeneous group of 
unrelated professional investors, none of whom possesses fifty percent 
of the voting power, but many of whom exercise significant influence 
over corporate behavior. Making matters worse, the relaxed regulatory 
environment has allowed new types of investors—mutual funds, 
sovereign wealth funds, family offices, hedge funds, and pension 
funds—to provide late-stage funding alongside more traditional 
venture capital.63 The entry of these investors, who may have different 
expectations and incentives than venture capital funds, may cause 
more disputes to wind up in court rather than being resolved privately. 
For example, in one newly common fact pattern, a privately 
backed firm suffers from an immediate liquidity crisis. An existing 
investor dangles a lifeline, but only in exchange for formal control; 
simultaneously, the investor uses its blocking rights to prevent the firm 
from pursuing alternative financing.64 The forced recapitalization 
inspires a lawsuit, raising the question whether the investor was a 
controlling shareholder when it proposed the transaction, with all of the 
fiduciary obligations—and added judicial scrutiny—that designation 
implies.65  
Nor is this complexity confined to private companies. More and 
more public companies are adopting dual-class share structures, often 
with sunset arrangements that may eventually leave control 
uncertain.66 They also often adopt “shareholder agreements” that grant 
 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. New firms help startups keep track of their owners, THE ECONOMIST (July 6, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2019/07/06/new-firms-help-startups-keep-track-of-their-
owners [https://perma.cc/3U93-NCX7]. 
 63. Pollman, supra note 59 (manuscript at 18).  
 64. See, e.g., Urdan v. WR Capital Partners, LLC, No. 2018-0343-JTL, 2019 WL 3891720, at 
*1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2019); Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Inv’rs, LLC, No. 
11802-VCL, 2018 WL 3326693, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 6, 2018); Calesa Assocs., L.P. v. Am. Capital, 
Ltd., No. 10557–VCG, 2016 WL 770251, at *4–5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2016); OTK Assocs., LLC v. 
Friedman, 85 A.3d 696, 702–06 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 65. See, e.g., Basho Techs., 2018 WL 3326693, at *1; Calesa, 2016 WL 770251, at *7; OTK 
Assocs., 85 A.3d at 724.  
 66. Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of 
Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 852, 854, 930–31. When Pinterest went 
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special control rights to certain favored shareholders, including the 
right to seat some number of directors.67 The Long Term Stock 
Exchange, a new stock exchange recently approved by the SEC, may 
encourage public companies to adopt tenure voting systems that grant 
long-term shareholders greater control rights than shorter-term 
investors.68  
In sum, the “controlling shareholder” designation has taken on 
a new legal significance at the precise moment when business realities 
have made the exercise of control more difficult to ascertain. 
A. Defining Control 
In the broadest sense, Delaware has defined control status to 
mean that the stockholder has “effective control of the board.”69 
Alternatively, the test has been described as requiring the “exercise[ ] 
[of] such formidable voting and managerial power that, as a practical 
matter, [the putative controller] is no differently situated than if it had 
majority voting control.”70 A finding of control may hinge on many 
factors, including voting power, relationships with board members, and 
“outsized” influence in the boardroom.71 No particular level of voting 
power is determinative;72 even stockholders with over thirty percent or 
forty percent of the vote have been found not to be controllers.73  
To be deemed a minority controller, the “power must be so potent 
that independent directors cannot freely exercise their judgment, 
 
public, for example, it allocated high vote shares to a circle of insiders and early investors, with 
sunset provisions that will result in the gradual erosion of control over time. See Pinterest Inc., 
Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1506293/000119312519099828/d697629ds1a.htm [https://perma.cc/XFS4-R86G]. Similarly, 
Cloudflare awarded high vote shares to various insiders and large investors, with the potential for 
the allocation of power to change over time as high vote shares are converted to low vote shares.  
Cloudflare, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1477333/000119312519244325/d735023d424b4.htm [https://perma.cc/7CD8-LY3B]. 
 67. See Gabriel Rauterberg, Allocating Control by Contract: An Empirical Analysis of 
Shareholder Agreements (working paper) (on file with author). 
 68. Annie Gaus, Stock Exchanges in Need of Reform. Is the Long-Term Stock Exchange the 
Answer?, THESTREET (May 19, 2019), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/stocks/stock-
exchanges-need-reform-ltse-the-answer-silicon-valley-14964363 [https://perma.cc/J4BP-8R28]. 
 69. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 307 (Del. 2015). 
 70. In re Rouse Props. Inc., No. 12194-VCS, 2018 WL 1226015, at *11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018). 
 71. Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Inv’rs, LLC, No. 11802-VCL, 2018 WL 
3326693, at *26–27 (Del. Ch. July 6, 2018).  
 72. In re Crimson Expl. Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8541-VCP, 2014 WL 5449419, at *10 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 24, 2014). 
 73. See, e.g., In re Rouse Props., 2018 WL 1226015, at *18–20; In re W. Nat. Corp. S’holders 
Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000). Both decisions were predicated 
on standstills that contractually limited the power of the blockholder. In re Rouse Props., 2018 WL 
1226015, at *7; In re W. Nat. Corp., 2000 WL 710192, at *2. 
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fearing retribution from the controlling minority blockholder.”74 This 
standard echoes, to some extent, the reason for suspicion of controlling 
shareholder transactions generally: as then-Chancellor Strine 
explained, “[I]t is important to remember that the overriding concern of 
Lynch is the controlling shareholders have the ability to take 
retributive action in the wake of rejection by an independent board, a 
special committee, or the minority shareholders.”75 Thus, when a 
minority controller is at issue, the appropriate question is whether the 
putative controller is “perceived as having” the capability to exact 
retribution.76  
In that vein, one critical factor toward a finding of control comes 
when the controller explicitly or implicitly threatens the independent 
directors personally, such as with a loss of board seats.77 Yet courts have 
also found the requisite level of control when controllers pose a threat 
to the corporate well-being, such that independent directors acquiesce 
in order to protect the corporation or the unaffiliated stockholders.78  
This latter notion of threat is important because it considerably 
broadens the universe of persons who may be considered controllers. 
For example, though control status should not be found solely because 
a stockholder exercises her contractual rights—such as rights to block 
a transaction or call a debt—control status may be found when 
contractual rights are used to coerce board action, which presumably 
occurs when directors fear that failure to comply will harm the entity.79 
Similarly, persons who control the day-to-day functioning of the 
corporation are in a position to retaliate against the company should 
their desires be thwarted, and if directors believe they must bow to their 
wishes to avoid that result, those persons, too, could be deemed 
controlling stockholders. Perhaps for this reason, control over 
 
 74. In re Rouse Props., 2018 WL 1226015, at *11; see also In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC 
S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 992 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 75. In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 441 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
 76. In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 553 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 77. See In re Pure Res., Inc., 808 A.2d at 436; Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 
1110, 1114–15 (Del. 1994); see also N.J. Carpenters Pension Fund v. Infogroup, Inc., No. Civ.A. 
5334-VCN, 2011 WL 4825888, at *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011) (finding control from a pattern of 
personal bullying and threats to sue the independent directors). 
 78. See Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Inv’rs, LLC, No. 11802-VCL, 2018 
WL 3326693, at *29–30 (Del. Ch. July 6, 2018) (threat to limit access to financing); In re Tesla 
Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at *16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) 
(board’s awareness of CEO’s “singularly important role in sustaining Tesla in hard times” when 
considering CEO’s insistence on board consideration of an interested transaction); Reis v. Hazelett 
Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 465 (Del. Ch. 2011) (threat to cut off dividends to minority 
stockholders); Williamson v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1663-N, 2006 WL 1586375, at *5 (Del. 
Ch. June 5, 2006) (“significant leverage” due to blockholders’ influence over company’s revenues). 
 79. Superior Vision Servs., Inc. v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 1668-N, 2006 WL 
2521426, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2006). 
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management is frequently cited as a factor in identifying control 
status.80 
The difficulty with this kind of analysis, however, is that it 
comes into play the lower the putative controller’s voting power. That 
is, to the extent the controller’s own wealth is bound with the company, 
it has an incentive to preserve the company’s value; this is precisely the 
benefit of having a controller in the first place.81 The lower the equity 
stake, the less important the company’s value to the putative controller 
and the greater its willingness to sabotage the company to advance its 
private interests.82 Though some controllers may have low stakes but 
high voting power—due to dual-class share structures, for example—in 
general, equity investment is associated with votes. Thus, tests that 
look to the likelihood of retaliation against the company may have the 
ironic effect of designating those shareholders with the least amount of 
voting power as controllers. 
These may have been the concerns that animated the analyses 
of the Delaware Supreme Court and the Chancery Court in Corwin 
itself, where a putative controller functionally ran the company on a 
day-to-day basis with very little equity investment or voting power.83 
The case involved the relationship between KKR, a publicly traded 
private equity firm that funded its takeovers with junk bonds, and 
KFN, a publicly traded shell entity that was created to buy those 
bonds.84 KFN, in practical effect, served as a vehicle to facilitate public 
investment in KKR’s takeovers, and KKR held less than one percent of 
 
 80. In re Tesla Motors, 2018 WL 1560293, at *16 & n.242; In re Zhongpin Inc. Stockholders 
Litig., No. 7393-VCN, 2014 WL 6735457, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2014), rev’d on other grounds sub 
nom. In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173 (Del. 2015); In re 
Cysive, 836 A.2d at 552; see also Basho Techs., 2018 WL 3326693, at *27 (control may be inferred 
from “high-status roles like CEO” and ability to control information flow). Conversely, lack of 
control over day-to-day management may weigh against a finding of controlling shareholder 
status. See, e.g., In re Rouse Props., Inc., No. 12194-VCS, 2018 WL 1226015, at *19–20 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 9, 2018); In re W. Nat. Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192, at *6 (Del. Ch. 
May 22, 2000).  
 81. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, 107 GEO. 
L.J. 1453, 1465 (2019) (“Whereas a majority owner cannot be replaced and would not be disciplined 
by the market for corporate control, her large equity stake in the controlled company provides 
powerful financial incentives to maximize company value. A majority owner bears most of the costs 
of her actions and captures most of the benefits.”). 
 82. Cf. id. at 1465–66 (controllers with “a small minority of the company’s equity 
stake . . .  therefore lack powerful financial ownership-based incentives,” which creates a “risk that 
they will act in ways that are contrary to the interests of other public investors”). 
 83. In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 992 (Del. Ch. 2014), aff’d sub 
nom. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); Corwin, 125 A.3d at 307.  
 84. In re KKR, 101 A.3d at 983–87. 
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KFN’s equity.85 Though KFN’s directors were independent and subject 
to election by KFN’s public stockholders, KFN had no employees and 
contracted with KKR to provide all of its investment functions.86 KFN 
could only terminate the arrangement without cause by paying KKR a 
very large fee.87 In sum, KFN functioned as something akin to a KKR-
specific investment company, with KKR serving in the equivalent of the 
sponsor and advisory roles.88  
In 2013, KKR proposed to acquire KFN in an all-stock deal. After 
forming a special committee to negotiate the transaction, KFN 
requested that KKR agree to waive its termination fee. KKR refused to 
do so.89 Ultimately, KFN agreed to be acquired by KKR, and the deal 
was approved by the public stockholders.90  
In a subsequent lawsuit, KFN shareholders argued, among 
other things, that KKR had been a controlling stockholder and the 
transaction should have been evaluated on that basis. The Chancery 
Court, affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, disagreed.91 It held 
that despite KKR’s influence over KFN’s day-to-day operations, 
authority over management ultimately rested with the board, over 
which KKR had no special influence.92 Yet it is impossible to examine 
the relationship between KKR and KFN and not recognize the 
“potential for [a] perception” by KFN’s directors, and its shareholders, 
that KKR might retaliate against KFN if thwarted.93 KKR completely 
controlled every functional aspect of KFN’s business up to and including 
the valuation of its assets94 (which would be the most critical factor on 
which the KFN board relied when negotiating a deal). Due to the 
termination fees and the close relationship between KFN and KKR, 
KFN had little realistic ability to extricate itself from that 
arrangement. KKR’s minimal equity stake only heightened the danger; 
with so little direct financial interest in KFN, it might have had little 
hesitation in using its influence to punish KFN if angered. It defies 
 
 85. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 306. Though the entities involved were LLCs rather than 
corporations, the parties litigated the case on the assumption that corporate standards would 
apply, and the Delaware courts proceeded on that basis. Id. at 306 n.3. 
 86. Id. at 306–07. 
 87. Id. at 306. 
 88. Despite the similarities, KFN was exempt from registration under the Investment 
Company Act. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1386926/000104746914001501/a2218341z10-k.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8G74-C5R5]. 
 89. In re KKR, 101 A.3d at 1000. 
 90. Id. at 988–89. 
 91. See id. at 983; see also Corwin, 125 A.3d at 306. 
 92. In re KKR, 101 A.3d at 983. 
 93. Kahn v. Lynch Comm’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994). 
 94. In re KKR, 101 A.3d at 986. 
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belief to imagine that these facts would not have weighed heavily on the 
minds of KFN’s directors and its shareholders; indeed, KFN directors 
were troubled by the fact that KKR initiated the transaction at a time 
when KKR’s stock was trading at an unusually high price while KFN’s 
was unusually low.95 (KKR, due to its responsibility for valuing KFN’s 
portfolio, naturally had great influence over how KFN would be 
perceived by the market.96)  
In fact, in the context of investment companies, relationships 
between sponsors, advisors, and funds are heavily regulated precisely 
because of the potential for exploitation.97 Among other things, 
transactions between investment companies and their sponsoring 
entities must ordinarily be reviewed for fairness by federal regulators;98 
in one older case, a court relied on those federal regulations to import a 
similar fairness requirement into Delaware law.99  
Nonetheless, at both the Chancery and Supreme Court levels, 
Delaware adhered to an extremely narrow interpretation of the test for 
controller status and concluded that it was not even “reasonably 
conceivable”—the pleading standard in Chancery Court—that KKR 
was a controlling stockholder.100 The Chancery Court explicitly 
discarded that portion of the test for controller status that rests on 
demonstrating control over the corporation more generally, and instead 
focused solely on control over the transaction at issue.101 Thus, despite 
the abundance of case law—decided both before and after Corwin—
treating control over day-to-day management as a factor to be 
considered in the controller analysis,102 the Corwin court cast that 
aspect of the arrangement aside.103  
 
 95. Id. at 987. 
 96. Cf. Kahn., 669 A.2d at 85 (remarking that controlling shareholders may use their power 
to time transactions to their advantage); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 
(Del. Ch. 2002) (same). 
 97. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee 
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 91–98 (2010) (summarizing mutual fund 
regulation). 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (2012).  
 99. See Harriman v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 153 (D. Del. 1975). 
This decision was subsequently cited with approval in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 
n.7 (Del. 1983). 
 100. In re KKR, 101 A.3d at 995; see also Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308 
(Del. 2015). 
 101. See In re KKR, 101 A.3d at 993–95.  
 102. See cases cited supra note 80. 
 103. In this, the court was not alone; it appears that when courts desire to read the test for 
control status narrowly, they equate the prong of control over the business generally with the 
prong of control over the transaction, even though the usual formulation is to state these as 
alternatives. See In re Sanchez Energy Derivative Litig., No. 9132-VCG, 2014 WL 6673895, at *8 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014) (“[A]ctual board control in the transaction at issue is undoubtedly the 
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B. Conflating Sanitization with Control 
The test for minority control status is further muddled by the 
fact that sanitization measures—intended to comply either with MFW 
or simply with the standards for interested transactions—may 
themselves be relevant to a determination of control in the first place.  
Even before the introduction of the MFW framework, then-
Chancellor Strine recognized that the inquiry into controlling-
shareholder status substantively overlapped with a determination as to 
whether a controlling shareholder transaction was fair to minority 
shareholders.104 This necessarily created a difficult line-drawing 
question: Was a sanitizing measure so strong as to neutralize controller 
status, or was it not quite strong enough to neutralize control but 
sufficiently strong to assure fairness to the minority?105  
After MFW, the inquiry is simplified in some ways. If the MFW 
sanitizing measures are employed, business judgment review is 
appropriate regardless of whether the interested party is deemed a 
controlling stockholder; thus, reviewing courts can limit themselves to 
a determination as to compliance with MFW and elide the question 
whether the interested party was, in fact, a controlling stockholder.  
That said, matters are more complex when some sanitizing measures 
are employed, but they fall short of the full MFW treatment. If they are 
insufficient to neutralize a putative controller’s control, then the lack of 
compliance with MFW triggers entire fairness review; if they are 
sufficient, however, business judgment review may be appropriate 
(even for those transactions that would have merited closer judicial 
review pre-Corwin). It can be very difficult to distinguish between a 
minority controller who did not employ MFW and simply an interested 
transaction that can be cleansed via other means. 
This was precisely the dilemma facing the court when 
shareholders of Tesla challenged that company’s acquisition of 
SolarCity.106 Elon Musk headed both companies, and several Tesla 
directors also had relationships with SolarCity.107 Thus, the acquisition 
 
defining and necessary feature of a minority controlling stockholder . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom., Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017 (Del. 2015); In re Crimson Expl. 
Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8541-VCP, 2014 WL 5449419, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014) (collecting 
cases to show that “a large blockholder will not be considered a controlling shareholder unless they 
actually control the board’s decisions about the challenged transaction”). 
 104. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 789–92 (Del. Ch. 2011); 
see also In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 548–49 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 105. Or to shift the burden of proof? See In re Cysive, 836 A.2d at 548–49. 
 106. See In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 28, 2018). 
 107. Id. at *1–4, *17. 
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was clearly an interested one and would be subject to fairness review 
absent appropriate sanitizing measures. Ultimately, the deal was 
conditioned on the affirmative vote of a majority of the disinterested 
outstanding shares of Tesla,108 but there was no attempt to use an 
independent special committee at the board level to negotiate the 
transaction.109 The critical question, then, was whether Musk—with a 
twenty-two percent Tesla stake—was a controlling shareholder.110 If he 
was not, the affirmative shareholder vote would be sufficient to trigger 
business judgment review under Corwin; if he was, the deal would be 
subject to entire fairness review.111 Ultimately, the Chancery Court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged that Musk was a controlling 
shareholder, partly due to his importance to Tesla and partly due to the 
fact that the lack of a special committee allowed Musk to influence the 
board’s decisionmaking process.112 In other words, it was something like 
the failure to comply with MFW that rendered Musk a controlling 
shareholder in the first instance. 
In so holding, the Tesla court compared the SolarCity deal to 
Michael Dell’s earlier buyout of his namesake company. Though 
Michael Dell held roughly sixteen percent of Dell at the time, and—like 
Musk—occupied a position of singular importance to the company’s 
future, Michael Dell was, according to the Tesla court, not a controller 
with respect to the buyout because he sterilized his own power with 
various sanitizing measures, including the use of a fully empowered 
independent special committee.113 These measures, however, were less 
strict than the measures that would later be mandated in MFW; for 
example, though the Dell buyout was originally conditioned on the 
majority vote of the outstanding unaffiliated Dell shares, that condition 
was eventually waived in the course of negotiations.114 
 
 108. Tesla Motors, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4), at 13, 59, 83 (Sept. 29, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1318605/000119312516724453/d241192ds4a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WU58-S5UL]. 
 109. In re Tesla Motors, 2018 WL 1560293, at *7. 
 110. Id. at *12–16. 
 111. In fact, it is possible that even absent Corwin, a conclusion that the deal lacked a 
controlling shareholder would have restored business judgment review. Corwin mandated that 
shareholder-approved buyouts of the subject company receive business judgment review—
arguably overruling prior case law that suggested the unique context of a buyout merited a higher 
level of scrutiny—but even prior to Corwin, disinterested shareholder approval could cleanse other 
types of interested transactions. See, e.g., Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 881–
82 (Del. Ch. 1999). That said, Corwin and its progeny represent, for want of a better term, a new 
mood in favor of dismissing cases in their early stages on the strength of a shareholder vote. See 
Friedlander, supra note 49, at 645. 
 112. In re Tesla Motors, 2018 WL 1560293, at *19. 
 113. Id. at *15. 
 114. Though the original merger agreement contained such a condition, an insufficient 
number of Dell shares favored the transaction. As a result, Michael Dell renegotiated the deal to 
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But compare the Tesla court’s reasoning with the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s recent holding in Olenik v. Lodzinski.115 There, a 
putative controller adopted MFW sanitizing measures, but too late in 
the process to meet MFW’s stringent requirements.116 The court held 
that the attempt to comply with MFW functioned as a concession that 
the adopting party was a controlling stockholder.117 Had this logic been 
applied to Dell, Michael Dell might well have been considered a 
controller. 
Thus, the best we can say is that sanitizing measures that do not 
comply with MFW may serve to neutralize a putative controller, such 
that he or she may avoid being characterized as a controlling 
shareholder in the first instance, or, alternatively, they may cement a 
finding of control by establishing the putative controller’s felt need for 
insulation. And layered on top of these conflicting mandates is the 
reality that the MFW measures are themselves intended to ensure 
complete neutralization of a controller’s power; a determination that a 
blockholder was not a controller because it employed some, but not all, 
of those measures requires a rather heroic calibration of the precise 
level of insulation necessary to ensure arm’s length bargaining opposite 
a party who enjoys, by any standard, outsized influence and 
informational advantages.  
C. Controlled or Concurrent? 
There are further levels of confusion regarding the definition of 
“controlling stockholder.” For example, courts distinguish between a 
“control group where those shareholders are connected in some legally 
significant way—e.g. by contract, common ownership, agreement, or 
other arrangement—to work together toward a shared goal”118 and a 
mere “concurrence of self-interest among certain stockholders.”119 The 
former constitutes a controlling stockholder group whose actions are 
evaluated under MFW; the latter does not, and interested transactions 
may be sanitized under Corwin. 
This is, in fact, an age-old issue. It has long been recognized that 
individual shareholders may have private reasons for preferring that 
 
require only the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting unaffiliated Dell shares. Dell, Inc. v. 
Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 14–15 (Del. 2017). 
 115. 208 A.3d 704 (Del. 2019). 
 116. Id. at 718. 
 117. Id. at 718 n.71. 
118.  van der Fluit v. Yates, No. 12553-VCMR, 2017 WL 5953514, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2017) 
(quoting Frank v. Elgamal, No. 6120-VCN, 2012 WL 1096090, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2012)). 
 119. Id. (quoting In re Crimson Expl. Inc. Stockholder Litig., No, 8541-VCP, 2014 WL 5449419, 
at *15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014)).  
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corporations adopt a particular policy or embark on a course of action,120 
and if a critical mass of these shareholders benefits from a potential 
corporate decision, they will be able to sway corporate conduct in their 
favor. Yet the law only intervenes when the shareholders form a 
sufficiently cohesive group. Articulating standards to identify the 
presence of such a group has bedeviled courts for nearly a century.121 
The problem was neatly illustrated in In re PNB Holding Co. 
Shareholders Litigation.122 Directors sought a corporate reorganization 
that would have the effect of cashing out all but the sixty-eight largest 
shareholders.123 These shareholders, not coincidentally, mostly 
consisted of the existing directors and their family members, who 
collectively controlled 59.5 percent of the vote.124 Yet then-Vice 
Chancellor Strine rejected the argument that they constituted a single 
controlling shareholder because while each was interested in this 
particular transaction, they had no other common interests or 
agreements to pool their votes.125 Each voted independently, but self-
interestedly, for the same deal.126 
PNB might be compared to Tesla. There, the court accepted the 
plaintiffs’ allegation that Musk was a controlling stockholder in part 
because the remaining Tesla directors’ own ownership in SolarCity 
inclined them to accept Musk’s proposal.127 The Tesla directors, in other 
words, were deemed to be under Musk’s control because they were 
independently, but concurrently, interested in completing the deal.128 It 
seems, then, that sometimes concurrent interests in the same 
transaction are a hallmark of control, and sometimes they are not.129 
 
 120. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 561 (2006) (describing the heterogeneity of shareholder interests); Grant M. Hayden & 
Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (2008) (same). 
 121. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 215–19 (1932).  
 122. No. Civ.A. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006). 
 123. Id. at *6–7. 
 124. Id. at *1. 
 125. Id. at *10–11. 
 126. Id.; see also van der Fluit v. Yates, No. 12553-VCMR, 2017 WL 5953514, at *5 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 30, 2017) (control group must be linked legally). 
 127. See In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at *3–
4, *13, *17, *19 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Similarly, it is common for disinterested shareholders to ratify the pay packages of 
corporate directors. See, e.g., Calma v. Templeton, 114 A.3d 563, 579–87 (Del. Ch. 2015) (reviewing 
Delaware cases in which shareholders approved director compensation packages). All directors are 
necessarily interested in their own pay (and are often themselves corporate shareholders), but 
there is no argument that their concurrent interests in their salaries render them, as a group, a 
single controlling shareholder for MFW purposes. 
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In a related vein, many courts distinguish between controller 
status and the status of a stockholder on whom a majority of the board 
is dependent. The former’s dealings are subject to entire fairness review 
absent the protections of MFW; transactions with stockholders on 
whom half the board are dependent, by contrast, may still be cleansed 
by a stockholder vote alone.130 Thus, in Sciabacucchi v. Liberty 
Broadband Corp., Vice Chancellor Glasscock concluded that a twenty-
six percent stockholder was not a controller because of various 
contractual restrictions on its ability to solicit proxies and increase its 
voting power.131 Yet he also held that a majority of the board lacked 
independence from the stockholder and, further, that these dependent 
directors had coerced the independent directors into endorsing the 
challenged transaction.132  
At the same time, plenty of authority suggests that the 
dependence of directors is significant to, if not dispositive of, the 
controlling shareholder inquiry.133 This is hardly surprising, given the 
similarity of the tests for controller status and for independence. 
Stockholders are controllers when they “dominate” the board; 
 
 130. Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 279 (Del. 2003); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 
A.2d 879, 882, 891 (Del. Ch. 1999). Presumably, a special committee of independent directors could 
also cleanse board action in these circumstances, assuming the transaction is not one that would 
itself require a shareholder vote. But see Hill & McDonnell, supra note 9, at 924–26 (discussing 
the unusual case of special litigation committees). 
 131. (Sciabacucchi I), No. 11418-VCG, 2017 WL 2352152, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017). 
 132. See Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp. (Sciabacucchi II), No. 11418-VCG, 2018 WL 
3599997, at *12, *15–16 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2018). Other decisions have similarly distinguished 
between boards where a majority of members lack independence from a stockholder, and 
stockholders who control the board. See, e.g., In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 
A.3d 980, 995 (Del. Ch. 2014) (considering the questions separately). 
 133. See, e.g., FrontFour Capital Grp. LLC v. Taube, No. 2019-0100-KSJM, 2019 WL 1313408, 
at *22–25 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2019) (relying in part on board members’ lack of independence to find 
presence of controlling stockholder); Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Inv’rs, 
LLC, No. 11802-VCL, 2018 WL 3326693, at *26 (Del. Ch. July 6, 2018) (listing “disinterestedness 
and independence” of directors as one of four factors contributing to the finding of a controlling 
shareholder); In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at *17 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (“[W]hether a board is comprised of independent or disinterested directors 
is relevant to the controlling stockholder inquiry because the answer, in turn, will inform the 
court’s determination of whether the board was free of the controller’s influence such that it could 
exercise independent judgment in its decision-making.”); Calesa Assocs., L.P. v. Am. Capital, Ltd., 
No. 10557-VCG, 2016 WL 770251, at *12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2016) (examining independence of 
director as part of controlling stockholder inquiry); Thermopylae Capital Partners, L.P. v. Simbol, 
Inc., No. 10619-VCG, 2016 WL 368170, at *14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2016) (holding that the test for 
controller status is met if defendant “had achieved control or influence over a majority of directors 
through non-contractual means, such as affiliation or aligned self-interest”); OTK Assocs., LLC v. 
Friedman, 85 A.3d 696, 702 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“effective control of the board” established in part by 
“close relationships with management”). 
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meanwhile, directors lack independence when they are so beholden to 
an interested party as to “sterilize[ ] their discretion.”134  
One may attempt to reconcile these divergent lines of precedent 
by arguing that courts distinguish between the presence of conflicting 
incentives (suggesting a lack of independence) from actual evidence of 
bias in decisionmaking (suggesting control).135 Yet even assuming that 
is a justifiable point of distinction—let alone one that should be decided, 
as it often is, on the pleadings—it is hardly consistent throughout the 
case law.136  
The inconsistency means that different cases could easily be 
viewed through alternate lenses that would presumably change their 
outcomes. Consider, for example, the transaction at issue in Harbor 
Finance Partners v. Huizenga.137 Republic Industries proposed to 
acquire AutoNation.138 Four out of Republic’s seven directors had 
interests in AutoNation in addition to their significant investments in 
Republic itself.139 One of those was Republic’s Chair and CEO, and the 
other three conflicted directors had significant ties to him—including 
his brother-in-law, who personally held ten percent of Republic’s 
stock.140 Though Republic nominally arranged to have a special 
committee of the three unconflicted directors negotiate the transaction, 
in practice, the special committee did very little, and Republic’s 
management arranged most of the deal.141 Nonetheless, Republic’s 
shareholders voted in favor.142  
In a subsequent lawsuit filed by Republic shareholders, the case 
was litigated as an ordinary conflict transaction, and, on that basis, 
then-Vice Chancellor Strine concluded that the vote of the disinterested 
Republic shareholders was sufficient to cleanse any conflicts.143 Yet 
 
 134. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984). Cf. Larkin v. Shah, No. 10918-VCS, 2016 
WL 4485447, at *13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016) (holding that to demonstrate control status, “the 
minority blockholder’s power must be so potent that it triggers the traditional Lynch concern that 
independent directors’ free exercise of judgment has been compromised”). 
 135. See, e.g., Sciabacucchi I, 2017 WL 2352152, at *17 (“The Complaint, however, does not 
evince actual control over a majority of directors; the pleadings are limited to showing that the 
directors share interests with the Stockholder Defendants, not that the directors are subject to 
actual control. . . . [I]t does not necessarily follow that an interested party also controls directors, 
simply because they lack independence.”). 
 136. Compare In re Tesla Motors, 2018 WL 1560293, at *17 (lack of independence in general 
is a factor in the control analysis), with Sciabacucchi II, 2018 WL 3599997, at *16 (actual coercion 
of independent directors not evidence of control). 
 137. 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 138. Id. at 884. 
 139. Id. at 882–83. 
 140. Id. at 882. 
 141. See id. at 885, 891. 
 142. Id. at 885. 
 143. Id. at 903–04. 
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imagine if the case had been litigated as a conflict transaction by a 
minority-controller Chair/CEO. The facts would be almost identical to 
those of Tesla, and the vote would not have been sufficient to cleanse; 
instead, the lack of a functioning independent committee and other 
protections would have ensured entire fairness review. 
The uncertainty regarding the legal implications of dependence 
is brought into sharper relief by the elasticity of the modern test for 
independence itself. For a long time, Delaware courts endorsed a 
relatively stringent analysis, requiring clear evidence of familial or 
financial ties before a director would be deemed dependent on another 
person.144 In recent years, however, Delaware has displayed an 
increased willingness to consider social and business connections as 
part of a holistic inquiry into director dependence.145 The revised 
analysis may more accurately reflect the “array of . . . motivations . . . 
that influence human behavior”146 but presents new complications for 
the controlling shareholder inquiry. Silicon Valley firms, for example—
both public and private—are inclined to stock their boards of directors 
with a repeat network of industry colleagues,147 raising the possibility 
that a variety of common arrangements could be interpreted as creating 
dependence and (taken to extremes) controlling shareholders.  
D. Does Voting Power Even Matter?  
The uncomfortable question that arises from all of this is 
whether controller status depends on voting power—or even stock 
ownership—at all. In Basho Technologies Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown 
Basho Investors, LLC,148 for example, Vice Chancellor Laster suggested 
that the two had little relevance to the controlling shareholder inquiry. 
He did not even bother to quantify the voting power of the putative 
 
 144. See, e.g., Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 
1051–54 (Del. 2004) (holding that a series of social interactions did not evidence lack of 
independence). 
 145. See, e.g., Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820 (Del. 2019); Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 
124, 126 (Del. 2016); Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017, 1023–24 (Del. 2015).  
 146. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 147. Erin Griffith, ‘We Know Them. We Trust Them.’ Uber and Airbnb Alumni Fuel Tech’s Next 
Wave, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/technology/silicon-valley-
network-mafias.html [https://perma.cc/YZX7-WJP4]; see also Sandys, 152 A.3d at 133–34 
(discussing repeat relationships in the tech startup world); In re Oracle, 2018 WL 1381331, at *16–
20 (describing the network of relationships linking Silicon Valley board members with each other); 
Pollman, supra note 59, at 44 (“VCs and other startup investors are repeat institutional players in 
a reputation-based market for investments.”). 
 148. No. 11802-VCL, 2018 WL 3326693 (Del. Ch. July 6, 2018). 
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controller anywhere in the opinion,149 and in his summary of the test 
for controlling shareholder status, equity ownership was listed as a 
secondary factor, coming after items like relationships with directors 
and managers and the exploitation of contractual rights to channel 
corporate behavior in a particular direction.150 
Significantly, recent decisions finding controlling status such as 
Basho, FrontFour Capital Group LLC v. Taube,151 and Tesla all 
highlighted, to a greater or lesser degree, that a minority shareholder 
may control a board’s decision by influencing the informational 
environment in which the decision is made.152 In Basho, the minority 
controller supplied false information to the board, and in FrontFour, the 
minority controller withheld information from the special committee.153 
Yet the problem of false or limited information occurs with 
(unfortunate) regularity.154 In RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis,155 
for example, a financial advisor with no equity stake or voting power 
was alleged to have manipulated a corporate board into agreeing to a 
suboptimal deal by, among other things, intentionally low-balling its 
valuation analysis. Given the advisor’s control over the sale process and 
the fact that two of the three directors on the committee largely 
abdicated their role, could the financial advisor be deemed to have 
“actually dominated and controlled . . . the deciding committee with 
respect to the challenged transaction”?156 Indeed, it is difficult not to 
compare the language used in RBC—that “the Board and the 
 
 149. The company had a complex capital structure, id. at *2–5, making a percentage vote 
figure difficult to ascertain.  
 150. Id. at *26–27. 
 151. No. 2019-0100-KSJM, 2019 WL 1313408 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2019). 
 152. See id. at *2; see also In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 
WL 1560293, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018); Basho Techs. Holdco, 2018 WL 3326693, at *7, 9. 
 153. Of course, in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), KKR’s 
control over information flow was not even sufficient to permit plaintiffs to survive a motion to 
dismiss. See Part II. 
 154. See generally Joel Edan Friedlander, Confronting the Problem of Fraud on the Board, 75 
BUS. LAW. (forthcoming Winter 2019–2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3359402 [https://perma.cc/CF5F-6R8G] (describing past cases).  
Significantly, shareholders can only learn about such conduct via discovery; even a books and 
records demand under Section 220—the typical route for shareholders denied discovery after 
Corwin and C & J Energy, see James D. Cox et al., The Paradox of Delaware’s “Tools at Hand” 
Doctrine: An Empirical Investigation 19 (Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 19-10, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3355662 [https://perma.cc/C4E6-BEGX]—
cannot be used to reach information that is not in the company’s possession. Cf. Forsythe v. CIBC 
Emp. Private Equity Fund, No. Civ.A. 657-N, 2005 WL 1653963, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 7, 2005). 
 155. 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015). 
 156. In re Rouse Props. Inc., No. 12194-VCS, 2018 WL 1226015, at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018). 
If so, it would mesh poorly with the Delaware Supreme Court’s conclusion that financial advisors’ 
obligations to their clients are “primarily contractual in nature,” rather than fiduciary. Jervis, 129 
A.3d at 865 n.191. 
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stockholders were operating on the basis of an informational vacuum 
created by” the financial advisor157—with the FrontFour court’s 
conclusion that a blockholder dominated the sale process by 
contributing to the “informational vacuum” in which the special 
committee operated.158 Thus, a test that relies on control of 
information—like many of the other factors in the controlling 
shareholder inquiry—is extraordinarily malleable.159  
That flexibility lends itself to manipulation by courts dissatisfied 
with the strictures of Corwin and C & J Energy. Numerous commenters 
have expressed doubt that a shareholder vote can meaningfully check 
managerial disloyalty even in the absence of a controlling stockholder 
because shareholders as a group are not positioned to investigate 
wrongdoing or bargain for better options; they are stuck with the 
transaction that is presented to them.160 Courts reviewing deals that 
would be cleansed under Corwin may therefore be incentivized to put a 
thumb on the scales in favor of a controlling-shareholder finding when 
the conduct at issue appears particularly egregious. 
Vice Chancellor McCormick was almost explicit about this 
reasoning in FrontFour.161 There, a fifteen percent blockholder in a 
company called Medley Capital engineered a transaction between that 
firm and two related entities, in part by manipulating a supine and 
dependent board.162 Vice Chancellor McCormick enjoined the 
 
 157. Jervis, 129 A.3d at 856. 
 158. FrontFour Capital Grp. LLC v. Taube, No. 2019-0100-KSJM, 2019 WL 1313408, at *2 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2019). 
 159. For a recent example, consider In re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation, No. 
9880-VCL, 2018 WL 5018535, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018), where an activist investor who 
obtained board seats via a proxy contest was alleged to have manipulated the board into a fire sale 
merger in part by withholding information about the acquirer’s plans. Given the activist’s 
involvement in the sale process, could it have been deemed a controlling shareholder? The 
possibility is not so far-fetched; for years, theorists have argued that activists should be recognized 
as having fiduciary obligations akin to controllers. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary 
Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1294–1303 (2008). Significantly, Delaware 
has recognized the ability of an activist to exert “negative” control by blocking board action, see 
Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014), the 
power of which has contributed to findings of control in other contexts. See Basho Techs. Holdco 
B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Inv’rs, LLC, No. 11802-VCL, 2018 WL 3326693, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 
6, 2018) (finding control in part due to investor’s ability to block share issuances); In re Tesla 
Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at *15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) 
(considering supermajority voting provisions that made it easier for Musk, with his large minority 
stake, to block corporate action); see also sources cited supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
 160. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Tomas Mondino & Randall S. Thomas, Understanding the 
(Ir)Relevance of Shareholder Votes On M&A Deals 67–69 (Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 19-
06, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3333241 [https://perma.cc/4X4Y-
8GSX]; Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Shareholder Approval Conundrum, B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019) (manuscript at 4). 
 161. FrontFour Capital Grp., 2019 WL 1313408, at *33. 
 162. Id. at *25. 
Lipton_PAGE 11/18/2019  6:52 AM 
2004 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:5:1977 
shareholder vote until appropriate disclosures could be made but 
refused to order that Medley Capital seek alternative merger 
partners.163 In so holding, the Vice Chancellor expressed regret that the 
prevailing legal standards prevented her from ordering what she 
believed to be a just remedy: 
At this stage, the most equitable relief for the Medley Capital stockholders would be a 
curative shopping process, devoid of [the blockholder’s] influence, free of any deal 
protections, plus full disclosures. Thereafter, if no better proposal surfaces, the Medley 
Capital stockholders would have the opportunity to cast a fully informed vote for or 
against the Proposed Transactions . . . . 
Under the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in C & J Energy, an injunction may not 
issue if it would “strip an innocent third party of its contractual rights” under a merger 
agreement, unless the party seeking the injunction proves that the third party aided and 
abetted a breach of fiduciary duty by the target directors . . . . Under these circumstances, 
C & J Energy leaves this Court no discretion—the most equitable remedy for Medley 
Capital stockholders cannot be granted. 
To ensure that Medley Capital stockholders are fully informed on any vote on the 
Proposed Transactions, FrontFour is entitled to corrective disclosures consistent with this 
decision, and Defendants are enjoined from consummating the Mergers until such 
disclosures have been made. FrontFour may also pursue a damages claim by amending 
their complaint, if FrontFour so chooses.164 
Given the context, Vice Chancellor McCormick’s conclusion that 
the blockholder was a controlling shareholder was almost unnecessary 
to her actual holding, namely, that the proxy statement omitted 
material information and would need to be revised. Instead, the finding 
of controlling-shareholder status appears to have been something of a 
prophylactic measure; by designating the blockholder as a controller, 
Vice Chancellor McCormick made clear that even if disinterested 
shareholders voted in favor of the deal—something that, statistically, 
they were likely to do despite obvious defects in the negotiating 
process165—the transaction would still be subject to entire fairness 
review for failure to meet MFW requirements. 
The Tesla decision has a similar air. Conflicts pervaded a 
negotiating process that seemed designed almost from the outset as a 
mechanism for using Tesla’s assets to bail out a pet project of Elon 
Musk’s. By holding that plaintiffs had, for pleading purposes, 
established Musk as a controller, Vice Chancellor Slights ensured that 
plaintiffs would at least be able to get the discovery that would allow 
for a more robust judicial review.  
To be sure, one of the first things a business law student learns 
is that even without a formal equity stake, contractual control can be 
 
 163. Id. at *33. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Cox & Mondino, supra note 160, at 7. 
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exerted to the point where fiduciary obligations follow.166 But all of this 
just raises the question whether the shareholder aspect of the 
controlling shareholder inquiry is necessarily doing any work. On this, 
it is useful to return to the facts of FrontFour: the fifteen percent 
blockholder in question was subject to an “echo voting” requirement 
that obligated it to vote its shares in proportion with those of the public 
stockholders.167 Its actual control over the subject company therefore 
did not come from its ownership stake, but from an arrangement similar 
to that between KKR and KFN: the controller served as a sponsor and 
advisor to an investment company. 
III. A MODEST PROPOSAL 
What all of this suggests is that at least some of the vagaries of 
the case law are traceable to courts’ vacillation between the Scylla of a 
capacious definition of control and the Charybdis of Corwin’s doctrinal 
rigidity. It is common for board members to lack independence from 
other board members or management; board members frequently rely 
on information supplied by others, who may themselves have private 
interests for preferring one course of action over another;168 and, as 
discussed above, any number of actors may be in a position to issue 
credible threats against the company. If all of these are treated as 
hallmarks of control, they could easily be stretched beyond reason. At 
the same time, ignoring them entirely risks papering over the very real 
Hobson’s choices that may afflict shareholders asked to approve 
conflicted transactions.  
What is missing is a framework for evaluating the factors that 
suggest control while simultaneously cabining the inquiry. To make 
progress on this front, we might return to first principles and inquire 
anew as to why we have adopted divergent regimes for interested 
transactions with corporate insiders generally, as compared to 
interested transactions with controlling shareholders. The critical 
difference seems to be more than simply a distrust of independent 
directors in the controlling shareholder context; instead, as Kahn v. 
Lynch articulated, the original motivating factor was a distrust of a 
 
 166. See Martin v. Peyton, 158 N.E. 77, 80 (N.Y. 1927) (recognizing that a lender may exercise 
sufficient control as to be considered a partner in the enterprise); BERLE & MEANS, supra note 121, 
at 212–13. 
 167. FrontFour Capital Grp., 2019 WL 1313408, at *21. 
 168. Board members are, in fact, encouraged to rely on such persons. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 141(e) (2019) (authorizing directors to rely on “any other person as to matters the member 
reasonably believes are within such other person’s professional or expert competence and who has 
been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation”).  
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majority-of-minority shareholder vote as a cleansing mechanism.169 
And the reason for that, presumably, is not the potential for retaliation 
standing alone, but the impossibility of minority shareholders 
practicing self-help. When a controlling stockholder is at the helm, the 
ordinary market mechanisms by which shareholders may defenestrate 
an unfaithful manager are unavailable, and it is that fact that 
necessitates judicial intervention.170 This explains why courts have 
adopted entire fairness review (and MFW cleansing) even for 
transactions that do not require a shareholder vote in the first instance: 
when the disinterested stockholders are powerless, none of the 
mechanisms of private ordering, including independent director 
approval, can be trusted to function effectively.  
If that is the case, then the flaw in the current approach may lie 
in the distance between the disease and the cure: courts’ focus should 
not be exclusively on whether the interested party has dominated the 
board in the past, but also on whether it is immune to shareholder 
discipline in the future. Under this test, the case for control would be 
stronger against those who enjoy an ongoing, pervasive influence over 
the company, if not by equity stakes then by contract (as existed in 
Corwin and FrontFour), whereas the case would be comparatively 
weaker for advisors hired to facilitate a single transaction, as in RBC. 
In the context of a merger vote, courts might consider whether the 
interested parties would be in a position to wreak vengeance should the 
deal fall through, and, if they did, whether the remaining shareholders 
would be able to remove them from their perch. To be sure, reorienting 
the test in this manner would not be a complete panacea—indeed, the 
effects may be slight—but it might help guide courts and provide them 
with some comfort that reliance on the more pedestrian indicia of 
control will not subsume the inquiry.  
This framework could also inform the analysis when a majority 
of the board is deemed dependent on an interested party to a 
transaction, as in Liberty Broadband. There, the court found a lack of 
control because Liberty was contractually prohibited from obtaining 
more than thirty-five percent of Charter’s stock and could not solicit 
proxies, but those same contracts guaranteed that Liberty would 
always have the right to nominate four directors to a ten-member board, 
all of whom were to serve on critical board committees.171 Liberty’s 
embedded control rights over the company, coupled with other directors’ 
 
 169. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994). 
 170. See Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (holding that controlling 
stockholder deals receive entire fairness review because of “the reality that . . . the controlling 
shareholder will continue to dominate the company regardless of the outcome of the transaction”).  
 171. See Sciabacucchi I, No. 11418-VCG, 2017 WL 2352152, at *7–14 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017). 
Lipton_PAGE 11/18/2019  6:52 AM 
2019] AFTER CORWIN 2007 
dependence, may have made it nearly impossible to dislodge, which in 
turn should have favored a finding of control. But by the same token, if 
a corporation were to undertake a transaction involving a single 
interested director, even one with multiple board relationships, a court 
might appropriately conclude that the director was not a controller 
because of the (relative) ease with which she and/or her compatriots 
could be ousted. In evaluating the situation, the court might consider 
such factors as the existence or absence of shareholder proxy access, the 
presence of a staggered board, plurality versus majority voting, or a 
high proportion of inside ownership. The court might even take into 
account the board’s history of responsiveness to shareholder demands, 
such as its implementation of precatory shareholder proposals. For 
example, in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation,172 the Chancery 
Court treated a company’s failure to modify executive pay packages in 
the face of shareholder disapproval as suggestive of a putative 
controller’s influence. 
A focus on shareholders’ power of self-help might also aid courts 
in distinguishing between persons with coincident interests and 
persons who coordinate to form a controlling block. For example, had 
the transaction in PNB failed, there was no chance that the 
shareholders outside of the “golden circle”173 could replace the directors 
who had advocated for a self-interested reorganization, and there was 
every possibility that the directors and their supporters would have the 
power and incentive to tunnel value from the company to themselves by 
alternative means. By contrast, if a critical mass of unaffiliated 
institutional blockholders in a public company all favored a merger due 
to their private interests—imagine a group of mutual funds who all hold 
shares in both a target and acquirer174—they would still be unlikely to 
share sufficient common interests and incentives to steer corporate 
benefits to themselves if the deal fell through. Unaffiliated 
shareholders, in other words, would not fear the continuing existence of 
a unified power set against them if the deal was rejected.175 
In her article Beyond Beholden, Professor Lin recommends a 
parallel type of analysis for determining a controller’s ability to sway 
nominally independent directors. She finds that when a controlling 
 
 172. No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 WL 1381331, at *16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018). 
 173. In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 18, 2006). 
 174. See Lipton, supra note 2, at 311–14 (discussing this increasingly common scenario). 
 175. Similarly, we may have few concerns about shareholder ratification of nonemployee 
director compensation because these directors, presumably, do not share a private interest with a 
significant portion of the stockholder base that would allow them to weather future challenges, 
and their individual interests may prevent them from coordinating with each other to leech value 
from the company by alternative means. 
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stockholder consists of a group of persons, the group may lack cohesion 
and be unable to dole out reward or punishment with any consistency; 
the group’s influence may therefore be correspondingly lessened.176 As 
she puts it, “[W]hen power is diffused, decisions are always the product 
of give-and-take. No matter his leverage, each actor’s ability to 
influence the outcome is ultimately dependent on the consent of the 
other actors, and this power reduces to nothingness if consent is 
withdrawn.”177 She therefore recommends that courts consider the 
controller’s own degree of cohesion when determining the appropriate 
level of scrutiny to apply to a challenged transaction.178 The flipside of 
that inquiry would consider the role of consent by the unaffiliated 
stockholders—and the likelihood of its withdrawal going forward—as 
part of the determination as to whether a person or group of persons 
constitutes a minority controller in the first instance. 
A focus on the power of unaffiliated shareholders would also 
allow for a more nuanced approach to disputes within private 
companies. Imagine, for example, a startup that has allocated certain 
control rights to venture capitalists while simultaneously issuing a 
substantial amount of common stock as compensation to its rank-and-
file employees. In this scenario, the common stockholders might be 
viewed as especially powerless relative to the capital providers. By 
contrast, when common stock is more tightly held—perhaps limited to 
founding members who also occupy managerial positions—the founders 
may be viewed as possessing greater ability to protect themselves in 
disputes with their investors, making it less likely that capital 
providers will be deemed to be controllers.179 
To be sure, in most cases, minority controllers are unlikely to be 
entirely insulated from challenge. In OTK Associates, LLC v. 
Friedman,180 for example, Vice Chancellor Laster assumed the 
defendant to be a controller due to a combination of contractual rights 
and director relationships, notwithstanding the fact that by the time of 
his decision, the entire board had been ousted in a proxy contest led by 
the plaintiff (assisted in part by the court’s own preliminary injunction 
preserving the status quo against the board’s defensive measures). 
Similarly, imperial CEOs and founders whose names are nearly 
synonymous with their companies may appear indispensable—and 
 
 176. See Lin, supra note 21 (manuscript at 39).  
 177. Id. (manuscript at 37–38). 
 178. Id. (manuscript at 41). 
 179. Cf. Pollman, supra note 59 (manuscript at 36) (describing how manager-stockholders 
often receive “sweeteners” in VC-orchestrated buyouts, demonstrating that these stockholders 
enjoy greater power than their employee-stockholder counterparts). 
 180. 85 A.3d 696 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
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thus impossible to unseat—but, as the saying goes, corporate 
graveyards are filled with the bodies of indispensable executives.181 
That said, the inquiry into control status should not depend on a finding 
of complete powerlessness on the part of shareholders, but instead 
should take into account whether the shareholders may encounter 
unusual obstacles in their efforts to reassert control.  
There are further implications to approaching the inquiry from 
the point of view of the unaffiliated shareholders. Suppose a controlling 
shareholder initiates negotiations with the board but then relinquishes 
control of the company—by, for example, shedding its stake—prior to a 
shareholder vote. The Delaware Supreme Court has suggested that the 
MFW standard still applies because the deal presented to shareholders 
will be tainted by the controller’s lingering influence.182 But in this 
scenario, shareholders are now free to protect themselves via ordinary 
market mechanisms. Once the specter of a thwarted controller is 
removed, there is no reason shareholders cannot evaluate a transaction 
negotiated under the shadow of a (former) controller’s self-interest in 
the same way they are presumed to be able to evaluate director-
interested transactions under Corwin and its ilk.183 Of course, by the 
same token, should a party become a controller after board negotiations 
but prior to the vote, then the transaction should be held to MFW 
 
 181. See, e.g., Catherine Clifford, Uber’s Travis Kalanick isn’t the Only One—Why Steve Jobs, 
Jack Dorsey and Others were Ousted From the Companies They Founded, CNBC (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/22/ousted-founders-ubers-travis-kalanick-steve-jobs-and-jack-
dorsey.html [https://perma.cc/K2QN-KLKU] (describing the ouster of, inter alia, Uber’s Travis 
Kalanick and Apple’s Steve Jobs); Elizabeth A. Harris, For Dov Charney of American Apparel, An 
Abrupt Fall From Grace, N.Y. TIMES, (June 19, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/business/dov-charney-american-apparel-founder-ousted-
amid-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/RF2Y-LMJU] (describing the ouster of American Apparel’s 
Dov Charney); Laura M. Holson, A Quiet Departure for Eisner at Disney, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 
2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/26/business/media/a-quiet-departure-for-eisner-at-
disney.html [https://perma.cc/A2LZ-Z66B] (describing the ouster of Disney’s Michael Eisner); Julie 
Jargon, Papa John’s Founder John Schnatter to Leave Board, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/papa-johns-founder-john-schnatter-to-leave-board-11551787717 
[https://perma.cc/BC6A-V6GY] (describing the ouster of Papa John’s John Schnatter); Chris 
Kirkham et al., Steve Wynn Steps Down as Wynn Resorts CEO, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/steve-wynn-to-step-down-as-wynn-resorts-ceo-1517972210 
[https://perma.cc/92SG-BW7E] (describing the ouster of Wynn Resorts’ Steve Wynn); David Gelles 
et al., WeWork C.E.O. Adam Neumann Steps Down Under Pressure, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/business/dealbook/wework-ceo-adam-neumann.html 
[https://perma.cc/RG5G-USFM] (describing the ouster of WeWork’s Adam Neumann).  
 182. See Olenik v. Lodzinski, 208 A.3d 704, 719 (Del. 2019) (“[D]efendants are not entitled to 
a pleading stage dismissal based on lack of control because the facts pled support the reasonable 
inference that EnCap acted as Earthstone’s controlling stockholder while key economic 
negotiations took place between Earthstone and Bold which set the financial playing field for later 
negotiations.”). 
 183. This, of course, assumes that the voting shareholders are aware of their newly 
emancipated status. In Olenik, the putative controlling stockholder continued to describe itself as 
such in SEC filings after shedding much of its voting power. See id. at 718.  
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standards, in recognition of the unaffiliated shareholders’ continuing 
vulnerability.  
That said, one drawback to evaluating a putative controller’s 
continuing influence is the relative indeterminacy of the inquiry; 
parties may have difficulty predicting, in advance, how a court is likely 
to adjudge their legal status. But if the above discussion demonstrates 
anything, it’s that the current test is hardly a font of clarity. Moreover, 
if transaction planners respond to uncertainty by voluntarily adopting 
strong cleansing measures for interested transactions, so much the 
better; this is precisely what Delaware law is designed to encourage.184 
Indeed, it is quietly acknowledged among the Delaware bar today that 
Corwin’s protections are so robust that corporate attorneys have trouble 
persuading their clients to adopt best practices;185 a little uncertainty 
surrounding the controlling shareholder determination (so long as there 
remains an appropriate theoretical through line) may be just what the 
doctor ordered.186 
Another objection may be something like fear of doctrinal drift. 
In the context of mergers, for example, Delaware law holds that 
corporate directors of a target company may not agree to terms or 
employ defensive tactics that would preclude potential acquirers from 
making a successful topping bid.187 In practice, however, Delaware has 
accepted an increasingly optimistic—some might say artificial—view of 
how a disfavored bidder might hypothetically defeat deal protection 
devices and other defensive measures. The effect, then, is to grant 
managers broad discretion to forestall hostile bids and favor friendly 
ones.188 A test for controlling status that focuses attention on 
 
 184. See MFW, 88 A.3d 635, 643 (Del. 2014) (“[T]he common law equitable rule that best 
protects minority investors is one that encourages controlling stockholders to accord the minority 
both procedural protections.”); Dell v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 
1, 37 (Del. 2017) (endorsing particular appraisal valuation techniques in part because they will 
encourage best practices).  
 185. See Slights, supra note 49, at 21. 
 186. This highlights another problem with drawing an inference of control from parties’ 
adoption of MFW protections, as the Olenik court recommended. See Olenik, 208 A.3d at 718 n.71. 
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potential lines of defense in future litigation. Moreover, even before MFW, it was common for 
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stockholder support. See generally Cain & Davidoff, supra note 55. And for certain types of 
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appraisal action. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 37 (deferring to deal price in part due to cleansing measures 
employed in the bargaining process).  
 187. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935 (Del. 2003); Unitrin, 
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995). 
 188. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures 
and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 349–60 (2018); see also 
Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681, 701–08 (2013). 
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shareholders’ ability to overthrow a tyrant might similarly become so 
narrowed as to be all but meaningless.  
It seems the only answer is for courts to remain mindful of the 
concerns that animated additional scrutiny of controlling shareholder 
transactions in the first place. This is not an area where the law adopts 
a philosophy of caveat emptor; to the contrary, it is often argued that 
the United States’ broad protections for minority shareholders function 
as a critical device for encouraging investment and facilitating the 
efficient allocation of capital.189 The treatment of putative controllers 
should reflect that reality. 
CONCLUSION 
Delaware’s difficulties in dealing with controlling shareholders 
are not new; inconsistencies and ambiguities go back decades. But the 
combination of Corwin, C & J Energy, and MFW have spotlighted those 
doctrinal fissures by requiring courts to draw artificially sharp 
distinctions between control and noncontrol transactions when in fact 
control exists on an increasingly nuanced spectrum. The distance 
between the legal inquiry and the factual reality may be unsustainable; 
in time, we may expect either a relaxation of Corwin—as courts draw 
more inferences of control or find other ways to evade its strictures190—
or, perhaps, a tightening of MFW: the Delaware Supreme Court may 
continue down the path it began in Corwin by narrowing the definition 
of control in the first place, or it may simply limit entire fairness review, 
and MFW cleansing, to a small subset of controller transactions. 
That said, Corwin itself may be inherently unstable. The 
decision is traceable to the Delaware Supreme Court’s perception that 
today’s powerful and diversified institutional shareholders have less 
need for judicial protection than the retail shareholders of days past,191 
but these institutions may be riven with conflicts that undermine the 
assumption of disinterest on which Corwin depends.192 At the same 
time, the power that shareholders wield is not static: regulatory efforts 
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are already underway to introduce new limitations. For example, the 
SEC may soon restrict the activities of proxy advisors193 and may curtail 
shareholders’ access to the proxy ballot.194 The Trump administration 
is also attempting to stifle pension funds’ involvement in corporate 
governance.195 If Delaware courts come to perceive that a small number 
of shareholders are so powerful that their votes operate to exploit the 
others—or that shareholders’ power has been reduced to the point 
where they are no longer positioned to protect themselves—the 
pendulum may swing back toward more robust forms of judicial review. 
The controlling shareholder problem will not disappear, but it could be 
submerged again as new types of conflicts bubble to the surface. 
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